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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The new sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code (MPC) 
forcefully assert the nature of sentencing as judicial province. “One 
underlying philosophy of the revised Code is that sentencing is, at its core, 
a judicial function.”1 Specifically, the new provisions aim to secure 
judicial discretion against unwelcome intrusions such as legislatively 
mandated minimum sentences, the more rigid forms of sentencing 
guidelines, a renewed emphasis on the role of the jury, and public demands 
for harsher sentences. 
But why, exactly, is sentencing a fundamentally judicial task? What 
sort of task is sentencing, anyway? Perhaps choosing the right punishment 
for an offender is an art, a matter of phronesis or practical wisdom. On this 
account, sentencing takes practice, skill, and inevitably, judgment. But 
there are other possibilities. Sentencing may be science rather than art; it 
may require the analysis of empirical data, and the question of appropriate 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. This Article was prepared for 
presentation at a panel on the Model Penal Code Sentencing Project at the January 2009 annual 
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. For lively conversation and helpful 
comments, I am grateful to panel convener Christopher Slobogin and to my fellow panelists Doug 
Berman, Kevin Reitz, and Bob Weisberg. 
 1. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.02 cmt. b, at 63 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); 
see also id. at 306 (“[A] driving philosophy of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing revision is that 
the judiciary should be the . . . most powerful institution within the multilevel, multi-actor system 
for criminal sentencing.”). 
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punishment may be one for which there are objectively ascertainable right 
and wrong answers. Or perhaps sentencing is a science in the sense that 
Alexis de Tocqueville invoked when he described lawyers as “masters of a 
science,” an enterprise requiring “certain habits of order, a taste for 
formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connection of 
ideas.”2 To think like a (proper) sentencer, maybe one needs to think like a 
lawyer, and not like a partisan advocate, but a neutral jurist—a judge. 
This Article examines the several and sometimes contradictory 
accounts of sentencing in the new MPC provisions. The seeming 
dichotomy between art and science is not the only contrast that may 
illuminate an inquiry into the nature of sentencing. One might also 
distinguish between an account of sentencing as a complex legal and 
political process, on one hand, and normative claims about the purposes of 
punishment, on the other. Briefly, I argue here that the new Code is at its 
best when it acknowledges the legal and political complexities of 
sentencing, and at its worst when it invokes the rhetoric of desert. When 
the Code focuses on the sentencing process in political context, it offers 
opportunities to deploy both practical wisdom and empirical analysis that 
may actually make American sentencing less arbitrary and, importantly, 
less frequent. When the Code retreats to retributive or desert theory as a 
source of sentencing reform, it appeals to indeterminate and unpredictable 
principles that threaten to undermine the new provisions’ more salutary 
proposals. 
Another avenue of inquiry would examine sentencing through the 
interplay of theory and practice. We might ask whether a theory of 
punishment can produce a theory of sentencing, one which could in turn 
provide a useful guide for sentencing practices. The new Code’s attention 
to the intersection of theory and practice takes form in its endorsement of 
limiting retributivism. At their best, the arguments collectively termed 
“limiting retributivism” have two great virtues. First, they are deeply 
concerned with the mechanics of actual sentencing practice, such as 
institutional design, empirical data, and interactions between various actors 
in a sentencing system. Second, they are (again, at their best) not 
particularly retributive. Often, limiting retributivism is not so much a 
punishment theory as an account of the uses—and limits—of punishment 
theory for sentencing practice. But at their worst, the claims of limiting 
retributivism can display all the vices of punishment theory: unsupportable 
and unverifiable claims to punitive power, divorced from a broader 
political theory and indifferent to the real-world implications of its claims. 
This Article examines the relationship between the new Code’s 
statement of sentencing purposes and its concrete institutional, procedural, 
                                                                                                                 
 2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 217 (Bruce Frohmen, ed. 2003) 
(1889). 
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and practical recommendations in the remaining proposed revisions. The 
danger, I argue, is that the retributive moments of the Code—the moments 
when it calls upon decision-makers to think like punishers—will impede 
the opportunities it provides for meaningful sentencing reform. 
Part II provides an overview of some key features of the revised 
sentencing provisions, noting that the most significant change comes not in 
the Code’s statement of sentencing purposes but in the interpretation and 
implementation of those purposes. Part III examines in detail the 
proportionality requirement of the revised Code, with a specific (and 
critical) focus on the role of retributivism and desert. Part IV continues the 
critique of desert, arguing that the revised Code’s emphasis on desert is in 
tension with, and likely to undermine, its professed commitment to more 
empirically grounded sentencing practices. Finally, Part V returns to the 
question whether sentencing is a distinctively judicial task. 
II.  FROM PURPOSE TO PRACTICE 
Promising “new underpinnings of punishment theory,”3 the revised 
sentencing provisions begin with a statement of their own purposes. The 
Code first identifies an apparently retributive requirement that punishments 
be “proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime 
victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”4 Other goals—deterrence, 
rehabilitation, incapacitation, victim restoration, and community 
reintegration—are to be pursued as well, but only “within the boundaries 
of proportionality.”5 The new Code also identifies parsimony—a “no more 
severe than necessary” provision—as a goal, along with judicial discretion, 
individualized sentences, greater uniformity and equality, humane prisons, 
and increased attention to empirical research on “the effectiveness of 
criminal sanctions as measured against their purposes.”6 
Importantly, the new § 1.02 (like its predecessor in the original Code) 
identifies the purposes of the sentencing provisions themselves; it is not 
framed as a list of the purposes of punishment.7 To understand the 
provisions, and to assess their likely impact, it is necessary to keep in mind 
this difference between the goals of punishment and the goals of the 
sentencing process. Of course, the two categories overlap to some degree, 
for one purpose of the sentencing process is to ensure punishments. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxx (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 4. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(i). As discussed below, the Code’s drafters are somewhat equivocal on the 
relevance of retributive theory to sentencing. See infra text accompanying notes 16–18 and text 
accompanying notes 59–66. 
 5. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii). 
 6. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(vii); see also id. § 1.02(2)(a)-(b). 
 7. Entitled “Purposes; Principles of Construction,” § 1.02(2) identifies “[t]he general 
purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official actors in the sentencing system.” 
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Whatever we identify as the purpose of punishment will also be a purpose 
of the sentencing process, but the sentencing process may have additional 
independent aims. The first part of the new § 1.02(2), subsection (a), lists 
several sentencing goals that are also goals of punishment itself: 
rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and so forth.8 In contrast, 
subsection (b) identifies goals of the sentencing process that are 
independent of the purposes of punishment. For example, uniformity 
among sentences is not itself a reason to impose punishment; one could 
achieve uniform sentences by punishing no one. Similarly, attention to 
empirical research on sentence effectiveness may be an aim of the 
sentencing process, but it is not itself a reason to punish. The difference 
between purposes of punishment and purposes of sentencing procedures is 
critical to the Code’s discussion of proportionality, as I elaborate below. 
In the five years since new draft provisions were first released, this 
statement of purposes has attracted more commentary than any other 
aspect of the Code. The attention is somewhat surprising, given that the 
revisions to § 1.02(2) are much less radical than the remainder of the 
proposed revisions. Like the new § 1.02, the original § 1.02 urged the 
pursuit of utilitarian goals within apparently deontological limits.9 Like the 
new § 1.02, the original § 1.02 aimed at differentiated sentences that 
corresponded to the relative severity of different offenses.10 Like the new 
§ 1.02, the original § 1.02 emphasized judicial discretion, individualized 
sentences, and reliance on empirical research.11 Meet the new Code, same 
as the old Code. 
More precisely, meet the new § 1.02, substantially similar to the old 
§ 1.02. While the stated purposes of the sentencing provisions have not 
changed radically, the interpretation and implementation of these purposes 
are significantly different in the new Code.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Subsection (a) of 1.02(2) is ostensibly concerned with the “general purposes of sentencing 
in individual cases,” whereas subsection (b) is concerned with the purposes of the system as a 
whole. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.XX cmt. b., at 267 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
But it would not be quite accurate to explain subsection (a) as a statement of the purposes of 
punishment (which are also purposes of the sentencing system). Included in subsection (a) is a 
parsimony principle—“to render sentences no more severe than necessary”—and parsimony is not 
itself a reason to punish. See id. § 1.02(2)(a)(iii). 
 9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a)-(c) (1962) (identifying utilitarian goals of 
prevention, correction, and rehabilitation, along with “safeguard[ing] offenders against excessive, 
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment”). The prohibition of excessive or disproportionate 
punishments was understood by its drafters to set forth limitations defined by “a common sense of 
justice.” Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
465, 468 (1961). For further discussion, see infra note 21. 
 10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(e) (1962). 
 11. Id. § 1.02(2)(e) (“to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization 
in their treatment”); § 1.02(2)(g) (“to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and 
knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of offenders”). 
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A.  A New Understanding of Proportionality 
First, with respect to interpretation: notwithstanding the reference to 
excessive and disproportionate sentences in the original Code, the drafters 
of the new provisions clearly view their proportionality limitation as an 
innovation. The new § 1.02 is said to “incorporate[] meaningful 
proportionality limitations not envisioned in the original Code.” 12 Perhaps 
the emphasis is on the word meaningful; indeed, the proportionality 
limitation of the old Code had little practical effect.13 To make 
proportionality meaningful, the new Code offers a retributive or quasi-
retributive interpretation of it. Sentences should be “within a range of 
severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime 
victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”14 As explained in the 
commentary, this account of proportionality is explicitly drawn from 
theories of limiting retributivism, under which the offender’s desert sets 
upper and lower limits to the sentence.15 Within those outer limits, 
sentencers may take into account utilitarian considerations other than 
desert. The new Code is somewhat equivocal on the extent to which it 
endorses retributive principles; the drafters do not include “retribution” or 
even “desert” in the recommended statutory language.16 The new draft 
explicitly declines to “codify a ‘just deserts’ philosophy of criminal 
penalties.”17 Notwithstanding this unease with the rhetoric of retribution 
and just deserts, the commentary indicates that the drafters understand 
proportionality to be a retributive concept.18 
This interpretation of proportionality is new to the Code. The original 
Code made no mention of desert or retribution in its statement of purposes, 
and its explanatory notes seemed to reject desert explicitly.19 The original 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. a, at 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007). 
 13. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii–xxix 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 14. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 15. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. a-b, at 3–8 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007).  
 16. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note, at 30 (Tentative Draft No. 
1, 2007) (“The revised Model Penal Code avoids use of the term ‘retribution’ . . . and speaks instead 
of ‘proportionality’ constraints on utilitarian sanctions.”). 
 17. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. i., at 17 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 18. See, e.g., id. § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note 29 (equating proportionality limits with retributive 
limits); id. § 6B.03 cmt. b., at 179 (referring to the factors relevant to proportionality—offense 
gravity, harm to victims, and offender blameworthiness—as “retributive anchor points”); id. 
§ 6B.03 cmt. c., at 181 (noting a widespread trend “toward a hybrid approach of retributive and 
utilitarian goals in sentencing reform” and endorsing that trend). 
 19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. 3, at 227 (1962) (rejecting desert and retribution as bases 
for imposing imprisonment).  
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Code did, as noted above, codify a proportionality limitation whose 
meaning was apparently derived from “the common sense of justice,”20 but 
justice was not conflated with desert: it was widely understood that the 
Code rejected desert as a sentencing principle.21 Contemporary members 
of the American Law Institute (ALI)—and contemporary sentencing 
theorists—would do well to revisit the notion that concepts of 
proportionality (and justice) can stand independently of claims of desert. 
As discussed in Part III, the new Code reflects an unfortunate and 
unfounded assumption that proportionality is a necessarily retributive 
principle. One way to understand the difference between the old and the 
new proportionality is that the old proportionality requirement was a goal 
of the sentencing system, independent of the goals of punishment, whereas 
the new proportionality requirement is linked to a retributive account of 
the purpose of punishment itself. 
B.  New Roles for Commissions and Judges 
The new statement of sentencing purposes is not a mere hortatory 
throat-clearing to precede the meat of the new provisions. The drafters are 
explicit about their intention to make § 1.02 relevant to the entire 
sentencing process, and they offer concrete guidance toward that end.22 
Here, I want to focus on the implementation of the proportionality 
requirement, especially as it interacts with the commitment to judicial 
discretion, and the implementation of the new Code’s commitment to 
“evidence-based sentencing.” 
Who should decide how much punishment is proportionate to a given 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Wechsler, supra note 9, at 468. 
 21. See, e.g., Norval Morris, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code: Balancing the 
Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 811, 814–15 n.12 (1987) (“The Comment specifically rejects as a valid 
reason for imprisonment that the person ‘deserves’ punishment for the bad deed committed.” (citing 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. 3, at 227 (1985))). As retributive theory became more popular 
among Anglo-American academics in the late twentieth century, some scholars argued that the 
Model Penal Code implicitly reflected retributive principles. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Criminal 
Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 287, 290 (2001) (identifying desert 
as one of several purposes embraced by the original MPC). The commentary to the MPC was 
revised in 1985, and the new commentary contained language that could be interpreted as leaving 
room for desert as a non-determinative, secondary sentencing principle. For example, the 1985 
comments explained that the Code was “based on the premise that ‘desert’ alone is not a sufficient 
justification for punishment.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Introduction to Art. 6 and 
7, at 16 (1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.02 cmt. 3, at 21 (stating that 
the Code was focused on crime prevention, “leaving no room for dispositions motivated merely by 
vindictive or retributive considerations.”). For more discussion of the revisionist retributivist 
reading of the Code, see Michele Cotton, Back With A Vengeance: The Resilience of Retributivism 
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1318–24 (2000). 
 22. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. a, at 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007); id. § 7.ZZ cmt. b, at 322–23 (noting “the revised Code’s broad-based effort to give greater 
prominence and effect to the purposes provision than in the 1962 Code”). 
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offense? Though the proportionality requirement of the new § 1.02 is, by 
its own terms, intended to guide all “official actors” in the sentencing 
process, judges and sentencing commissions are most explicitly charged 
with ensuring proportionate sentences. The new Code recommends the 
creation of a permanent sentencing commission that will “set presumptive 
sentences for defined classes of cases” in accordance with offense gravity, 
harm to victims, and offender blameworthiness—the same proportionality 
factors identified in § 1.02.23 The commentary explains that this task 
entails a moral judgment and is necessarily imprecise, but, consistent with 
the theory of limiting retributivism, the commission is expected to “find 
agreement that a defined presumptive sentencing range for each category 
of case is safely within the outer limits of undue lenity or severity.”24 
Further, the commission should devise guidelines that “invite sentencing 
courts to individualize sentencing decisions in light of the purposes in § 
1.02(2)(a),” and the guidelines may prioritize among the various principles 
of § 1.02(2)(a).25 Again, the commentary is fairly specific in its 
recommendations for implementing proportionality. For example, a two-
dimensional sentencing grid “can assist the commission in the goal of 
furthering proportionality in punishment across different offenses.”26 
Judges, too, are empowered to make real the Code’s commitment to 
proportionate sentences, and their power in this regard exceeds that of the 
sentencing commission. In general, trial court judges are to exercise their 
sentencing authority consistent with § 1.02. More specifically, judges may 
depart from the guidelines “when substantial circumstances establish that 
the presumptive sentence . . . will not best effectuate the purposes stated in 
§ 1.02(2)(a).”27 This provision seems to give judges power to overrule the 
sentencing commission on issues of proportionality, except the new Code 
provides that judges may not depart from the guidelines based on “mere 
disagreement” about the appropriate sentence for ordinary cases.28 Instead, 
departures should occur only when aggravating or mitigating “factors take 
the case outside the realm” of the ordinary cases anticipated by the 
guidelines.29 Judges are further empowered to render “extraordinary 
departures” from otherwise mandatory sentences when “extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances demonstrate . . . that the mandatory penalty 
would result in an unreasonable sentence in light of the purposes in 
                                                                                                                 
 23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.03(2), at 178 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); see 
also id. § 6.A.01 (requiring establishment of permanent sentencing commission to develop 
sentencing guidelines). 
 24. Id. § 6B.03 cmt. b., at 180 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).  
 25. Id. § 6B.03(4)–(5), at 178. 
 26. Id. § 6B.02 cmt. c., at 163. 
 27. Id. § 7.XX(2), at 264. 
 28. Id. § 7.XX(2)(b), at 264. 
 29. Id. § 7.XX(2)(a), at 264. 
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§ 1.02(2)(a).”30 These two departure standards—“substantial 
circumstances” for most departures and “compelling circumstances” for 
extraordinary departures from purportedly mandatory sentences—give 
sentencing courts considerable power to implement their judgments of 
proportionality. This allocation of power reflects “a driving philosophy” of 
the revised Code that “the judiciary should be the central and most 
powerful institution within the multilevel, multi-actor system for criminal 
sentencing.”31 
A proposed section on appellate review of sentences would give the 
judiciary still greater power to assess and impose proportionate sentences. 
Under the draft § 7.ZZ, a defendant may appeal a sentence on the ground 
that it is “too severe,” and the appellate court is empowered to vacate or 
modify the sentence if the court finds it to be disproportionate given the 
factors articulated in § 1.02(2)(a)—offense gravity, victim harm, and 
offender blameworthiness.32 This “subconstitutional proportionality 
review” is envisioned by the drafters of the new Code to provide “greater 
bite” than the weak proportionality requirement that federal courts have 
found in the Eighth Amendment.33 The commentary faults the Eighth 
Amendment standard as “flexible” in its consideration of both retributive 
and utilitarian goals of punishment and contrasts the Eighth Amendment 
standard to the Code’s proportionality requirement, which is based on “the 
standard indices of retributive or deserved penalties.”34 Thus, in this 
appellate review provision, one sees the hope that retribution will provide 
stronger limits to sentence severity than other punishment theories. As I 
discuss in the following part, that hope is misplaced. 
On the account in the new MPC sentencing provisions, determinations 
of proportionality are not the exclusive province of any single actor in the 
sentencing system. Ideally, considerations of proportionality should guide 
each decision-maker, including the legislature, the sentencing commission, 
the prosecutor, the trial court, and the appellate court. But it is the 
judgments of the sentencing commission, reflected in presumptive 
guidelines, and those of courts, reflected in departures or modifications on 
appeal, that will be most important to sentencing outcomes.35 And between 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. § 7.XX(3)(b), at 265. 
 31. Id. § 7.07B cmt. i., at 306. 
 32. Id, § 7.ZZ(2) at 318; id. § 7.ZZ(6)(b). This provision has been submitted to the American 
Law Institute (ALI) for discussion purposes, but it has not been presented for formal approval. 
 33. Id. § 7.ZZ cmt. g., at 329; see also id. §1.02(2) cmt. d., at 10–11. 
 34. Id. § 7.ZZ cmt. g., at 329–30. That the Code’s drafters are more concerned with overly 
severe sentences than with unduly lenient ones is suggested by an asymmetry between the grounds 
for appeal and the authority of the appellate court. Either the defendant or the government may 
appeal a sentence as too severe or too lenient, id. § 7.ZZ(2), but the appellate court is authorized to 
modify a sentence only on the grounds of excessive severity, id. § 7.ZZ(6)(b). 
 35. Of course, the legislature could take control over proportionality assessments by enacting 
strict mandatory sentences. The revised Code disapproves of mandatory sentences, as will 
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the sentencing commission and the courts, the latter has the last word: “the 
sentencing guidelines should be viewed as ‘first drafts’ of proportionate 
sentences for ordinary cases, not as final pronouncements for all cases.”36 
C.  Evidence-Based Sentencing 
So far, I have focused on the interpretation and implementation of the 
new Code’s proportionality requirement. But the new sentencing 
provisions also offer extensive guidance on the implementation of other 
purposes identified in § 1.02. Of particular interest—and, I suspect, of 
greatest practical impact—is a broad commitment to the collection and 
dissemination of information: to transparency in the sentencing system, to 
research on the consequences of different kinds of penalties, and to 
“impact statements” that measure and forecast prison populations, fiscal 
costs, and the distribution of penalties among different demographic 
groups.37 In the new sentencing provisions, information collection and 
analysis is identified as both an end in itself and as a means to other 
goals—such as the production of more uniform sentences and the 
reduction of racial disparities. Sentencing is not exactly a science, and the 
new Code does not pretend that it is. But nor is sentencing strictly an art, 
or an exercise in normative moral reasoning. On many sentencing 
questions, it is possible to collect and consider relevant empirical data. 
Like the proportionality requirement, the emphasis on data was present 
in the original Code.38 And as is true of the proportionality requirement, 
the new Code provides much more specific guidance on implementation 
than did the original Code. With respect to evidence-based sentencing, it is 
the sentencing commission rather than the judiciary that has foremost 
responsibility for making the aspiration a reality. The commission is 
directed to develop “a correctional-population forecasting model” and to 
conduct research and data collection across a number of substantive 
areas.39 At least once a year, the commission should use the forecasting 
model to project “sentencing outcomes”—e.g., how many people will be 
sentenced—for existing policies, and the commission should also project 
                                                                                                                 
apparently be reflected in the not-yet-drafted § 6B.05. See id. § 6B.03 cmt. f., at 184. 
 36. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. b., at 7; see also id. at cmt. d., 10–11 (“The sentencing commission is 
not the sole, or even the most powerful, actor in the revised Code’s sentencing structure with 
authority to make proportionality determinations. . . . The final arbiters of proportionality in 
individual cases, under the revised Code, are the courts.”). 
 37. See, e.g., id. § 1.02(2)(vii)-(viii); id. § 1.02(2) cmt. n., at 21 (noting the Code’s embrace of 
“evidence-based” sentencing). 
 38. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(g) (1962); see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
§ 1.02(2) cmt. n., at 42 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (noting that the new Code “retains the spirit” 
of the original § 1.02(2)(g), “but employs more directive language”). 
 39. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.04(1)–(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); id. 
§ 6A.07, at 133–34. To enable this research, the new Code explicitly provides that the sentencing 
commission should employ a research director and supporting staff. Id. § 6A.03(1)–(2), at 84. 
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likely outcomes when new policies are introduced.40 The sentencing 
commission is also directed to conduct an omnibus review of the 
sentencing system every ten years. The omnibus review should address, 
among other things, the extent to which the sentencing system is fulfilling 
the purposes identified in § 1.02(2).41 In addition to these reports, the 
commission is to collect and analyze data on a number of specific 
questions, such as the effect of offender and victim characteristics on the 
sentence imposed.42 
Two areas of data analysis are of particular importance: dollars and 
demographics. First, the new Code repeatedly emphasizes the 
commission’s role in predicting and reporting the monetary cost of 
sentencing policy.43 The commission is to ensure that we have detailed 
information about what we are spending to punish. This task is crucial 
because as prison populations have steadily increased in the United States, 
only one factor seems even partially successful as a source of outer 
limits—the price tag.44 If one aim of sentencing reform is a reduction in 
the incarcerated population, the promulgation of detailed fiscal impact 
statements may be the most effective mechanism to get there. Experience 
suggests that dollars are more likely to serve as a limiting principle than 
desert. 
Second, and perhaps more controversially, the new Code directs 
sentencing commissions to investigate discrimination and inequities in the 
sentencing system, and to project the racial impact of sentencing policies.45 
Demographic projections are one piece of the new Code’s efforts to 
“eliminate inequities in sentencing across population groups.”46 The 
drafters identify racial and ethnic minorities as “population groups” of 
particular interest, but leave the language broad enough to encompass 
other “vulnerable groups” that may be subject to discrimination in the 
criminal justice system.47 Importantly, the commentary notes that the mere 
fact of racial disparities, standing alone, is not sufficient reason to reject a 
given sentencing policy.48 In some instances, disparate racial impacts at 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. § 6A.07(1), at 133. 
 41. Id. § 6A.09, at 147–48. 
 42. Id. § 6A.05(2)(c), at 100. 
 43. See, e.g., id. § 6A.07, at 133. 
 44. This has been most evident in states with huge prisoner populations such as California and 
Texas. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 
CRIME & JUST. 207, 207 (2008); see also LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
BEYOND BARS: CORRECTIONAL REFORMS TO LOWER PRISON COSTS AND REDUCE CRIME, Executive 
Summary IV (1998), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/144/report144.pdf; see generally 
Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 47, 80–84 (2008). 
 45. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.05(2)(f), at 100 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); id. 
§ 6A.07(3), at 133. 
 46. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(iii), at 2. 
 47. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. j., at 17–18. 
 48. See id. § 6A.07 cmt. d., at 138. 
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sentencing are the product of racial patterns in criminal behavior.49 But, 
some punishment disparities are traceable to bias in the criminal justice 
process, and the new demographic impact statements are aimed to “force[] 
these facts . . . into the open.”50 
The sentencing commission is not the only decisionmaker charged with 
attention to demographic disparities. For example, a trial court judge may 
choose to interpret a statute or guideline in the manner that would 
minimize racial or ethnic disparities.51 Still, judges will not necessarily be 
well-positioned to assess broad demographic patterns, and the collection of 
such data is primarily the responsibility of the sentencing commission. 
D.  A New Conception (or Two) of Sentencing 
The two broad themes of the new Code discussed here—proportionality 
and evidence-based sentencing—suggest two different conceptions of 
sentencing. The Code’s new account of proportionality assumes that 
sentencing requires a moral judgment of the offender’s desert. Sentencing, 
on this account, is not a hard science or a mathematical calculation; it 
requires discretion, moral reasoning, and the exercise of judgment. Not 
surprisingly, though sentencing commissions may offer the first word on 
proportionate sentences, judges get the last. In the individual case, 
sentencing is a judicial function. 
The quest for evidence-based sentencing presents a somewhat different 
conception. It assumes that facts matter as much as or more than moral 
judgments. Specifically, the new directives to sentencing commissions to 
gather and analyze data assumes that sentencers need to know costs, 
demographic impact, recidivism statistics, and other facts in order to 
choose sentencing policy. Again, the notion of evidence-based sentencing 
is not quite a claim that sentencing is a science, but it is a view of 
sentencing as much more scientific than a desert judgment. 
The two approaches are in some tension. To resolve the tension, it 
might be argued that the divergent approaches simply reflect the difference 
between the particular case and systemic outcomes. Sentencing as a matter 
of desert judgments focuses on the individual offender, while sentencing as 
a matter of empirical evidence focuses on aggregate outcomes and the 
system as a whole. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, given the 
revised Code’s emphasis that proportionality is a matter of comparative or 
relative punishment severity. As we explore the nature of sentencing, it is 
important to consider both the individual and systemic perspectives. As the 
next two parts will suggest, however, desert-based proportionality and 
evidence-based sentencing are not easily reconciled. 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 138–39. 
 50. Id. at 139. 
 51. Id. § 7.XX cmt. b., at 268. 
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In short, the revised Code sets forth mechanisms to turn broad goals 
into meaningfully different practices. Proportionality—understood as a 
deontological limitation on consequentialist goals—and evidence-based 
sentencing are important goals, and it is fortunate that the ALI has devoted 
substantial efforts toward realizing them. But for all its attention to 
practical mechanisms, the MPC sentencing project has paid relatively little 
attention to available evidence of the actual operation of desert claims in 
sentencing decisions. The next two parts explore the ways in which desert 
undermines, or is at odds with, the commitments to proportionality and 
evidence-based sentencing. 
III.  DESPERATELY SEEKING PROPORTIONALITY 
For a few reasons, the Code’s new version of a proportionality 
requirement is unlikely to lead to changes in American sentencing 
practices. First, the new Code equivocates on what proportionality actually 
means; the drafters seem reluctant to embrace fully retribution or just 
deserts, even as they assume that proportionality is an inherently 
retributive idea. Second, if the new MPC proportionality is a desert-based 
principle, it will be subject to the indeterminacy and elasticity that have 
always plagued desert judgments. Third, there is likely to be considerable 
political opposition to any sentencing system that allows judicial 
determinations of desert to trump popular desert judgments. 
A.  Ambivalence about Retribution 
By its own terms, § 1.02(2) defines a proportionate sentence as one that 
corresponds to offense gravity, harm, and offender culpability. These 
factors are listed as three independent considerations, but neither the 
Code’s commentary nor broader sentencing literature supports this 
characterization. In most accounts, the “gravity” of an offense is itself a 
function of the harm to the victim and the offender’s culpability.52 Putting 
aside this variation on the concept of offense gravity, the new § 1.02(2) 
recreates a juggling act that is characteristic of recent academic discussions 
of proportionality and desert. In this act, familiar terms are invoked and 
defined in terms of one another; the conceptual insights are few and the 
practical upshot is unclear. Proportionality is often defined in terms of 
desert, and desert in terms of “offense gravity” or “crime seriousness,” and 
crime seriousness in terms of harm and culpability, and culpability in terms 
                                                                                                                 
 52. In an influential study, Andrew von Hirsch argues for a theory of proportionate sentencing 
that makes deserved punishment a function of crime seriousness. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR 
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 45–46 
(1985). Crime seriousness, which seems equivalent to the MPC’s term “gravity of the offense,” is in 
this account determined with reference to harm and culpability. Id. at 64; see also Donna H. Lee, 
Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 567 (2008) 
(defining offense gravity as a function of harm, culpability, violence, and magnitude). 
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of blameworthiness, and blameworthiness in terms of desert.53 What was 
desert, again? It is a matter of moral intuition, on some accounts; on others, 
it is a “placeholder” for still other values.54 As a grand finale to the 
juggling act, desert is sometimes simply equated with justice—as though 
justice were itself a transparent and uncontested notion.55 
Perhaps it is unfair to lump together so many different accounts of 
desert, some of which reflect careful attempts to achieve conceptual 
clarity. More charitably, one might say that criminal desert is typically 
described as a function of crime seriousness (or offense gravity), which is 
itself the product of two components: the tangible harm of the crime, and a 
less tangible factor described as culpability or blameworthiness. But even 
on this account, desert remains elusive. Harm is meaningful only up to a 
point; we might agree that murders and rapes cause harm, but the harm of 
many other offenses is a matter of continuing dispute.56 Culpability or 
blameworthiness is still more inchoate, and sentencing theorists tend to 
focus on whether certain factors are relevant to culpability instead of 
explaining what culpability is.57 Even when one strives to be charitable, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that desert theory takes a widely held 
but imprecise intuition that wrongdoers should be punished and attempts, 
without much success, to impose onto this intuition philosophical rigor. 
Somewhere in the resulting theory, couched in the language of culpability, 
blameworthiness, moral wrong, desert, or justice, one always reencounters 
the original mushy intuition. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See ANDREW ASHWORTH & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING (2005); 
VON HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 34–36, 64; Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against 
Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 708–10 (2005). 
 54. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (1997) (connecting desert to moral intuitions, but also arguing that moral judgments can be 
objectively true). I have discussed the indeterminancy of desert in more detail elsewhere. See Alice 
Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1308–
13 (2006) [hereinafter Desert, Democracy]; Alice Ristroph, The New Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 47–48, 173–74 (Paul Robinson et al. eds, 2009). 
 55. Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as 
Controlling Crime, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009); see also Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating 
Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 564 (2008) (arguing that 
Eighth Amendment proportionality is based on a “felt sense of justice”). 
 56. Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
109, 139–40 (1999). 
 57. “In sentencing, however, the concept [of culpability] has hardly been studied.” VON 
HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 71. von Hirsch does not offer a conception of culpability, but does 
identify relevant considerations: the actor’s mental state, including both his motives and any 
significant mental disability, and the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances such as 
necessity or duress. Id. at 71–73; see also Lee, supra note 52, at 571–72 (following von Hirsch, but 
adding age, education, drug dependence, and employment records as relevant determinants of 
culpability). 
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B.  The Elasticity of Desert Revisited 
The charge that desert is incoherent or indeterminate is not new; 
indeed, the theory of limiting retributivism is, in part, an effort to answer 
precisely that charge. Though desert cannot tell us exactly how much to 
punish, the limiting retributivism argument goes, it can tell us that some 
punishments are too much (or too little). A related defense of desert 
focuses on empirical findings that people assess the relative seriousness of 
offenses consistently. The “empirical desert” literature claims that these 
popular judgments should serve as the basis for sentencing policy.58 When 
the juggling is finished, the concrete claims of both theories turn out to be 
relatively modest. As punishments approach extremes of severity or 
lenience, people will tend to object to the sanctions as too much or too 
little. And people seem to agree on a rank ordering of common offenses. 
Neither claim is particularly surprising, or particularly useful. 
Modest as the contributions of limiting retributivism and empirical 
desert turn out to be, the new Code deploys both lines of argument. Rather 
than define gravity or culpability (or specify the determinants of harm), the 
Comment to § 1.02(2) simply depicts proportionality as a question of 
“moral intuitions” that “are almost always rough and approximate.”59 
Invoking Norval Morris and limiting retributivism, the Comment suggests 
that proportionality principles will dictate “a range of permissible 
sanctions that are ‘not undeserved.’”60 These judgments may vary 
somewhat from one community to the next, but community sentiments can 
be empirically assessed to serve as the basis of sentencing policy. 
“[P]roportionality limitations in a democratic society are best derived 
through cooperative and collective assessment of community sentiment.”61 
(Somewhat contradictorily, the new Code also empowers judges to 
overrule a community’s collective assessment of desert through the power 
of judicial proportionality review, as discussed above.) 
As early drafts of the Code revisions have circulated over the past few 
years, commentators have focused more attention on § 1.02(2) than any 
other aspect of the proposed changes.62 The new statement of sentencing 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for 
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 66–67 (2007). 
 59. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt., at 5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 6; see also id. at 31 (“Across a pluralistic nation, different people draw their moral 
instincts from a variety of separate yet (for them) irreducible first principles. [The Code requires] 
that there be collective input on ranges of proportionate sanctions through the informed, 
experienced, and diverse membership of a sentencing commission.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 62. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 53, at 180; Michael H. Marcus, Limiting 
Retributivism: Revisions to Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 295, 
312–13 (2007); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 17–21, 59–
60, 69, 81–83 (2003); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 
86–89 (2003). 
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purposes has been critiqued both as too retributive and as not retributive 
enough.63 Perhaps more swayed by the former critique, the present draft 
self-consciously avoids the term “retribution” and emphasizes that it is not 
a codification of just deserts theory.64 Indeed, one gets the sense that the 
ALI resigns itself to a form of retributivism as a last resort, as a necessary 
means to the end of proportionality restrictions on punishments. If this 
account is correct, the ALI members are not alone.65 The renewed 
popularity of retributive sentencing theory seems largely motivated by a 
search for proportionality limitations on criminal sentences.66 This 
roundabout path to reluctant retributivism is likely to end in 
disappointment. Desert is not the only or best source of proportionality 
restrictions on criminal sentences. Indeed, proportionality principles are 
often invoked as limitations on government power outside the context of 
punishment, and it is this non-punitive proportionality that is most likely to 
limit the power to punish. 
Before elaborating on proportionality as a principle of limited 
government, it is worth examining the weakness of desert-based 
proportionality in more detail. Most importantly, experience shows that 
desert does not function as an effective limiting principle. Instead, the 
concept of desert is sufficiently elastic that almost any existing sanction 
can plausibly be defended as deserved.67  
For an illustration, one need look no further than the revised Code’s 
commentary. The commentary notes that California is one of a few 
jurisdictions to codify retribution as a controlling principle of sentencing,68 
but later refers to California’s Three Strikes Law to illustrate the overly 
severe sentences that the Code’s new proportionality principle would 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 53, at 180–83 (criticizing new statement of 
sentencing purposes as not retributive enough); Marcus, supra note 62, at 301–02 (criticizing new 
statement of sentencing purposes as too retributive); Rubin, supra note 62, at 17–20 (same); 
Whitman, supra note 62, at 92–95 (same). 
 64. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note 30–31 (Tentative Draft No. 
1, 2007) (noting the Code’s avoidance of the “ideologically charged” term “retribution” and its 
continuing emphasis on utilitarian principles); id. § 1.02(2) cmt. i, at 17 (“The revised Code does 
not codify a ‘just deserts’ philosophy of criminal penalties.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Kevin Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for 
Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 556 (2002) (“One of the chief benefits of retributive theory is 
that it suggests a proportional ordering of the severity of sanctions.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 52, at 532 (endorsing retributivism as a means to the end of 
proportionality limitations on sentences); Malcolm Thorburn & Allen Manson, The Sentencing 
Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 278, 
310 (2007) (book review) (“[O]ne of us embarked on this project as an unrepentant critic of just 
deserts. He is now a convert who accepts the fundamental role of proportionality. . . .”). 
 67. Here I am drawing on arguments developed at greater length, with detailed examples of 
the elasticity of desert, in Ristroph, Desert Democracy, supra note 54, at 1308–13. 
 68. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Note 31–32 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
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disallow.69 Indeed, the Three Strikes Law, infamously applied in Ewing v. 
California70 to support a likely life sentence for a shoplifter, has been a 
bête-noire for other recent advocates of desert as a limiting principle.71 But 
the people who enacted and defended California’s law understood it as a 
way to guarantee that repeat offenders would get what they deserved. 
Laymen’s retributive principles were reflected in the law’s preamble and in 
discussions of the law in the popular media.72 Desert did not limit and 
seems to have facilitated Three Strikes in California. 
Notably, the renewed attention to desert in Anglo-American sentencing 
theory coincided with the explosion of the United States prison population 
and the imposition of increasingly severe sentences. Correlation is not 
causation, of course, and desert theorists take pains to explain why they are 
not to blame for the more severe sentences.73 But the coincidence of the 
resurgence in desert theory with the rapid increase in sentence severity 
does suggest that, at the very least, desert has failed as a limiting principle. 
C.  Popular and Elite Conceptions of Desert 
The inherent elasticity of desert is not the only reason it has failed as a 
limiting principle. Additional complications stem from the fact that 
academics and sentencing elites have been unable to claim exclusive 
authority over desert determinations. One vision of limiting retributivism is 
that judges and other sentencing authorities, informed by scholarly desert 
theories, will recognize that American sentences are now harsher than 
what is deserved and will reduce sentence severity accordingly. In the eyes 
of ordinary citizens, however, many criminals fail to get as much 
punishment as they deserve.74 As one California resident described her 
support for California’s Three Strikes Law, “TV gives us this 2 1/2 minute 
sound bite about the poor soul who stole a piece of pizza, [asking] if he 
deserves to spend 25 years to life in prison. Well, the truth of the matter is, 
he probably does.”75 
This conflict between populist conceptions of desert and academic or 
elite conceptions has appeared in many other contexts. Some scholars 
argue that reduced sentences in certain American states and in Western 
Europe were achieved through the successful implementation of desert as a 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 330. 
 70. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 71. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW 
DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 4 (2006); Lee, supra note 53, at 695–99. 
 72. See Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1315–18. 
 73. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 53, at 102. 
 74. See Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1311 n. 62. 
 75. Stephanie Simon, Backers of Three Strikes Unflinchingly Defend Law, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 
1996, at A1, A16 (quoting a murder victim’s mother). 
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limiting principle.76 But with time, these alleged success stories look less 
successful. When elites on sentencing commissions or in other positions of 
power have reduced sentence lengths based on their determinations of 
desert, they have often been met with active resistance and legislative 
pushback.77 
It should be noted that this critique of desert—that desert is too elastic 
to serve as an effective source of proportionality restraints—echoes 
criticisms of utilitarian punishment theory.78 So, for example, some 
retributive theorists have acknowledged non-retributive, utilitarian 
accounts of proportionality, but they quickly reject those accounts as 
insufficiently rigorous to prevent unduly severe, but socially useful, 
sanctions.79 The truth may be that all the mainstream justifications of 
punishment are subject to the charge of elasticity: applied to real-world 
sentencing policies, the theories can and have been invoked to justify 
punishments that academic experts believe are excessive. 
All of this should suggest that if we are concerned with the scale of the 
United States prison population, we should not look to a restatement of 
punishment justifications for help. It is unlikely that the problem of too 
much punishment stems from a shortcoming of punishment theory—if 
anything, we may have too much punishment theory. The plethora of 
philosophical apologies for punishment means that rhetoric is available to 
defend almost any sentencing policy or any individual punishment. If we 
are to reduce the scale of punishment, we do not need more statements of 
reasons to punish. Instead, we need more attention to the costs of 
punishment and more skepticism about penal power. 
D.  An Aside: Proportionality Without Desert? 
I should be clear that the critique here is aimed at desert, not at the 
concept of proportionality per se. I have argued previously that 
proportionality should be understood as a principle of limited government 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, 83, 96, 
104 ( Michael Tonry ed., 2004). 
 77. See Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1324. 
 78. See generally FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 60–75 (1995) 
(arguing that theories of incapacitation are deployed to justify excessive sentences); Francis Allen, 
Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in SENTENCING 110, 114 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von 
Hirsch eds., 1981) (criticizing theories of rehabilitation for permitting increasingly severe 
sentences); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62 (1974) (criticizing the concept of 
dangerousness as too vague to prevent excessive prison sentences); Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst when Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 949, 971–75 (2003) (criticizing deterrence rhetoric as imprecise and as authorizing excessive 
sentences). 
 79. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 31–32 (noting that “[t]he first systematic defense 
of the principle of proportionate sanctions was utilitarian,” but finding the utilitarian proportionality 
principle “weak and prone to exceptions”); Lee, supra note 53, at 738–39. 
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that is independent of particular theories of justified punishment.80 In the 
sentencing context, proportionality means that the power to impose 
criminal sanctions is limited by various individual interests and political 
considerations. Claims that a punishment is disproportionately severe are 
most defensible when they are claims that the punishment exceeds the 
state’s legitimate power. And it is possible to conceive of limitations on 
government powers without adopting particular views of the purposes 
underlying specific exercises of those powers. For example, we can 
conceive of the power to tax, and limits upon it, without adopting a 
particular theory of the purpose of taxation. 
Indeed, the idea of proportionality reflected in the new Code is a 
peculiar historical and geographical artifact that has dominated Anglo-
American retributive theory in the latter half of the twentieth century. It is 
the notion that to speak of proportionality in the same sentence as 
punishment requires adoption of a specific account of the purposes of 
punishment. As just noted, some retributive scholars recognize non-
retributive accounts of proportionality but argue that such accounts are 
inferior to retributive proportionality.81 A starker form of this claim has 
appeared in the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with 
Justice Scalia’s assertion that “[p]roportionality . . . is inherently a concept 
tied to the penological goal of retribution.”82 This claim would be news to 
many courts around the world that regularly apply proportionality as a 
constitutional principle beyond the context of criminal justice.83 
Indeed, even United States courts occasionally rely on a not-
specifically-punitive concept of proportionality. The requirement in 
constitutional doctrine that certain coercive or intrusive state actions be 
“narrowly tailored” to serve “compelling state interests” reflects the 
principle that state power must be proportional to the interest that allegedly 
justifies the power.84 Even more explicitly, the Court’s “congruence and 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 
263 (2005). 
 81. See supra note 79. 
 82. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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 84. Ristroph, supra note 80, at 293; see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, 
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proportionality” test asks whether congressional action under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is congruent and proportional to a documented 
constitutional violation. Section 5 enforcement powers are triggered by 
specific social or political problems (e.g., discriminatory conditions), and 
the parameters of those powers are determined by the magnitude of the 
relevant problems. “There must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end.”85 
Applied to criminal sentences, a similar form of proportionality 
analysis would inquire whether the exercise of punitive power was 
proportional to the problem or injury that gave rise to the power. As I have 
elaborated in greater detail elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth 
Amendment sentencing decisions demonstrate a mode of constitutional 
analysis that assesses crimes, and their constitutional significance, without 
any reference to theories of punishment.86 By focusing on the traditional 
elements of crimes—conduct and mental state—we might find a way to 
compare crimes to one another and require proportionality without delving 
into punishment theory. 
Though this broader, non-desert-based proportionality would be 
preferable to the apparently retributive proportionality of the MPC 
revisions, it should be emphasized that there are risks in relying on any 
form of proportionality as a tool of sentencing reform. This becomes clear 
when we consider the mechanisms by which proportionality is to limit 
sentences. For example, as a guide for legislatures and sentencing 
commissions, proportionality is unlikely to lead to considerable changes in 
practice; those decisionmakers probably don’t think the sentencing policies 
they have already developed are disproportionately severe.  
To operationalize proportionality with meaningful results, the new 
Code looks beyond commissions and legislatures and empowers judges to 
conduct independent proportionality review. If this review is based on 
desert assessments, I suspect it is not likely to be any more popular—or 
tolerated in democratic systems—than previous attempts to apply elite 
conceptions of desert to limit majoritarian choices. Even if the Code’s new 
proportionality review were based on a broader conception of 
proportionality, many are likely to view such review as an undue assertion 
of judicial power against majoritarian choices. In the end, proportionality 
returns us to the questions raised in my introduction: what sort of task is 
sentencing, and why should it be distinctively judicial? I want to return to 
those questions, but to answer them, it is worth first exploring the ways in 
which desert analysis may limit the more scientific conception of 
sentencing that informs some of the new Code’s provisions. 
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IV.  EVIDENCE AND EMPIRICISM 
As discussed above, the new Code displays a strong commitment to the 
collection and dissemination of information. It calls for transparency in the 
sentencing system, research on the consequences of different kinds of 
penalties, and “impact statements” that measure and forecast prison 
populations, fiscal costs, and the distribution of penalties among different 
demographic groups.87 The Code’s drafters aspired to implement Norval 
Morris’s “evidence-based treatment penology.”88 Under this approach, 
sentencing is more science than art: it requires the collection and analysis 
of empirical data, and it promises to test falsifiable propositions about the 
benefits of sentences. 
There is an obvious tension between the new Code’s appeals to desert 
and its endorsement of “evidence-based sentencing.” Claims of desert are 
not falsifiable, whether or not they possess “moral reality” as claimed by 
some retributive theorists. And the sort of empirical data to which the 
Code urges attention—the financial impact of sentences, or 
disproportionate racial impacts—are irrelevant to most theories of desert. 
On most accounts, a moral claim that an offender deserves ten years in 
prison is not affected by the fact that the state cannot afford to support him, 
or that the offender’s incarceration will further exacerbate racial 
disproportions in the prison population. 
The news may be even worse—judgments of “desert” may serve as an 
opportunity for racial bias to enter the criminal justice system. Research on 
capital sentencing, a context in which jurors are frequently urged to make a 
direct assessment of desert, reveals an unsettling tendency to find black 
defendants who kill white victims more deserving of death than those who 
commit similar crimes but with a different defendant-victim racial match-
up.89 
And whatever the causal relationship between the concept of desert and 
race and class disparities in sentencing, desert may protect those disparities 
from efforts to eliminate them. Most individuals who receive criminal 
sentences have done something illegal, even if not the precise offense of 
conviction. Hence, even if desert is always based on a finding of illegal 
action, we can safely conclude that all those poor, black men in prison 
deserved at least some punishment. The color and poverty of our prison 
population and death rows are not products of discrimination, the argument 
goes, but the unfortunate results of the fact that racial minorities and poor 
people are disproportionately involved in criminal behavior. The 
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demographic disparities are too bad, but we have to give these criminals 
what they deserve. The new Code accommodates this reasoning with its 
insistence that “[p]rojected numerical disparities by race or ethnicity will 
not always supply a sound basis for avoiding an otherwise-justified 
punishment policy.”90 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp91 
provides a stark illustration of the defeat of empiricism by notions of 
desert.92 Warren McCleskey challenged his death sentence as a violation of 
his right to equal protection. To support his claim, he introduced an 
empirical study of death sentences in Georgia that appeared to show 
patterns of racial bias.93 The Court dismissed this empirical research as 
inconclusive, reasoning that McClesksey had failed to prove that his 
particular sentence was a product of intentional discrimination.94 
Famously, the Court “decline[d] to assume that what is unexplained is 
invidious.”95 A theory of desert enables this choice to give the benefit of 
the doubt to the sentencer even in the face of empirical evidence of racial 
disparity. It is easier to ignore unexplained and seemingly invidious 
patterns if we are confident in the overall justice of what we do, and the 
notion of desert provides that confidence. In short, desert-thinking may 
contribute to biases, and even if it does not, it provides a safe harbor for 
racial disparity. 
The moral warranty offered by desert may also sometimes insulate 
sentencing practices from charges of disutility. Strong public support for a 
particular utilitarian policy may shape public conceptions of deserved 
punishment, as apparently occurred in the case of California’s Three 
Strikes Law. At the same time, more contested claims of utility or disutility 
may not be subjected to rigorous scrutiny if we can avoid the conflict by 
retreating to desert. In fact, given that conceptions of deserved punishment 
are easier to expand than contract, sentencing policies originally motivated 
by utilitarian concerns may become immune to claims of disutility once we 
have convinced ourselves that the sentences are deserved. This 
phenomenon may be evident with respect to long prison sentences for 
recidivists. In many instances, the policy choice to require such sentences 
was originally motivated by a perceived need to incapacitate dangerous 
offenders, but quickly justified in terms of desert as well. Recent research 
suggests that these lengthy prison terms may do little to reduce crime, 
because offenders are incarcerated long past the age at which they are 
                                                                                                                 
 90. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.07 cmt. d,138 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 91. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 92. Id. In this paragraph and the next, I reprise arguments I first made in Ristroph, supra note 
54, at 1336. 
 93.  481 U.S. at 286–87. 
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likely to commit new offenses.96 But as long as discussions of sentencing 
policy are dominated by the rhetoric of desert, any evidence of nonutility 
or disutility is likely to have little impact. 
When the drafters of the new Code call for “evidence-based penology” 
and for more rigorous empirical research, perhaps they hope that the facts 
will speak for themselves. Perhaps the hope is that once people see how 
much sentences cost, and how little they apparently deter, the only rational 
response will be to reduce the length of prison sentences and look for other 
alternatives. But facts never speak for themselves. Some decisionmaker 
must always assess the significance of facts. Someone must ask, is it 
relevant that an increase in the minimum sentence for drug possession will 
have this projected effect on the corrections budget? If punishing crack 
possession more severely than the possession of powder cocaine puts more 
black men in prison, is that itself a reason to change the policy? The 
danger of desert is that it preserves the possibility that some will say the 
costs are worth it, the inequities deserved. 
I should be clear that I do not recommend that we simply redirect our 
faith from the gods of desert to the gods of empiricism. As just noted, 
empirical evidence always requires interpretation, and interpretation is 
always at least partially normative. The facts themselves will not tell us 
what to do. Bernard Harcourt has made the related argument that 
purportedly falsifiable claims of utility are never adequately justified by 
empirical evidence.97 There comes a “moment when the empirical facts 
[run] out . . . yet the reasoning continue[s].”98 
The inevitable space between theoretical or empirical 
premises and the final judgment derives, in the end, from that 
imperceptible fissure in the human sciences between the not-
falsified, the not-yet-falsified, the apparently unfalsifiable, the 
verified but only under certain questionable assumptions, and 
truth. In the empirical domain—no less than in philosophical 
discourse, legal analysis, and public policy debates—proof 
never followed mathematical deduction, but rested instead on 
assertions—whether empirical or logical—that may well have 
been true, but for which other entirely reasonable hypotheses 
could have been substituted.99 
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But it is one thing to be attentive to the limits of empiricism as a source 
of justifications for punishment, and another to dismiss it altogether.100 
There are ways in which better information about sentencing might 
improve the sentencing process, and it would be unfortunate if a revitalized 
rhetoric of desert were to blind us to empirical evidence of the practical 
consequences of our sentencing choices. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
So what kind of task is sentencing, and why should judges have more 
control over it than legislators, ordinary citizens serving as jurors (or 
voters), prosecutors, or sentencing commissioners? The new sentencing 
provisions of the MPC rightly imply that sentencing is neither strictly art 
nor pure science, but a complex process that requires exercises of 
judgment in an atmosphere of political disagreement. At their best (but 
unfortunately, not uniformly), the new provisions remind us that the task 
of sentencing is not determined by a theory of punishment. In fact, 
contrary to the new Code’s presumptions, an official endorsement of a 
desert-based theory of punishment might logically imply that sentencing is 
not a primarily judicial function, for it is not clear that judges are best 
equipped to make determinations of desert. 
Sentencing is most appropriately a judicial task if we understand it to 
occur in the context of ongoing disputes. In other words, sentencing should 
be understood as an act of adjudication. But on this account, thinking like a 
sentencer is markedly different from thinking like a punisher. To the 
(retributive) punisher, the dispute is over once the offender has been duly 
convicted. Once guilt has been established, punishment is implied and the 
remaining question is only the scope of desert. The defendant’s continuing 
protests, or societal concerns about cost or other consequences of the 
sentence, are not relevant to the desert determination. 
In reality, the justification of punishment remains contested, even after 
a determination of guilt. Indeed, I would argue— and have argued—that 
punishment always remains incompletely just, imperfectly legitimate.101 
But even among those who disagree with this penological skepticism, there 
is disagreement about what, precisely, justifies punishment. More 
importantly, punishment is not the only thing a modern state does, and 
there is much disagreement about how to fit the enterprise of punishment 
within the larger political enterprise. The key point is that after a 
conviction, disputes continue. The task of sentencing is a task of 
negotiating those disputes. 
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